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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Christopher Lee
Brown's motion to suppress evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At approximately 11 :45 p.m., Officer Cwik observed a blue minivan idling in the
Hastings bookstore parking lot after hours. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L18.) The
minivan was missing its back window.

(4/30/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-13.)

A piece of

opaque plastic was taped in its place, in violation of Idaho Code § 49-943. (4/30/2012
Tr., p.9, Ls.11-19.) After observing the vehicle leave the parking lot and following it as it
circled the block, Officer Cwik enforced a traffic stop.

(4/30/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.)

Brown was the driver of the minivan. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) Officer Cwik told
Brown about the violation and requested his license, registration, and insurance, which
he then investigated through dispatch. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10.)
Prior to encountering Brown, Officer Cwik had learned of complaints of drugs
being sold in the area out of a vehicle matching the description of Brown's blue minivan.
(4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.6.) After running the records check, Officer Cwik
went to speak with Brown and, before returning his license, registration, and proof of
insurance, discussed with Brown his driving pattern and requested consent to search
his vehicle. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-18; p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.24.) Brown granted
consent.

(4/30/2012 Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24.)

Officers searched Brown's vehicle and

ultimately discovered large amounts of marijuana and other evidence implicating Brown
in delivering controlled substances. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.17, L.19.)
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The state charged Brown with possession of a controlled substance with the
intent to deliver. (R., pp.36-37.) Brown moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
course of the investigative detention, arguing that the detention was unjustified at its
inception and unreasonably extended. (R., pp.38-39, 65-73.) After a hearing on the
motion and briefing by the parties, the district court granted Brown's suppression
motion, holding that the detention was extended and the extension was unreasonable.
(R., p.75; 5/24/2012 Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.8.)

appeal. (R., pp.80-82.)

2

The state filed a timely notice of

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded that Brown's detention was extended
and that any extension was unreasonable?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Concluding That Brown's Detention Was Extended And That
Any Extension Was Unreasonable
A.

Introduction
During the course of a traffic investigation, Brown consented to a search of his

vehicle. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14, L.4.) Brown moved the district court for an
order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of that search.

(R., pp.38-39.)

After a hearing on Brown's motion, and briefing by the parties, the district court
concluded that Brown's detention had been extended and that the extension was
unreasonable; therefore his consent was invalid.

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-22.)

Application of the correct legal standards to the facts presented at the suppression
hearing, however, shows that the detention was not extended for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. In the alternative, if the detention was extended, any extension was based
on articulable suspicion and was therefore reasonable.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review on a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302,
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

4

C.

Officer Cwik Did Not Unreasonably Detain Brown During The Course Of His
Traffic Stop
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic
stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more
similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.
App. 2003).

"An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific

articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
Therefore, initiating a traffic stop based on actual observations of a traffic infraction is
reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
Ruling on Brown's motion, the district court found the following facts:

Officer

Cwik observed a blue minivan missing its rearview window idling in the Hastings parking
lot after hours.

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-21.) A piece of opaque plastic was taped

across the back window, in violation of Idaho Code § 49-943.

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.5,

Ls. 15-21.) After observing the vehicle leave the parking lot and following it as it circled
the block, Officer Cwik enforced a traffic stop. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.12.)
Brown was the driver of the vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) Officer Cwik told
Brown about the violation and took his license, registration, and insurance, which he

5

used to check for warrants and the status of Brown's license through dispatch.
(5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-24.) After running the records check, Officer Cwik returned
and, before returning Brown's license, registration, and proof of insurance, discussed
with Brown his driving pattern and requested consent to search his vehicle. (5/24/2012
Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.5; p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.5; p.9, Ls.8-21; see also 4/30/2012 Tr., p.11,
Ls.11-18; p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.18.) Brown granted consent and officers proceeded to
search his vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.17-21.)
The district court found that there was "no reason to believe that Mr. Brown's
consent was coerced or threatened out of him."

(5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-5.)

The

district court also noted that the entire discussion between Officer Cwik and Brown, after
Officer Cwik finished running the records check, only lasted about 30 seconds.
(5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-21.)

However, because Officer Cwik did not return Brown's

license, registration, and proof of insurance before requesting consent to search, the
district court found that Brown's detention was extended and that the extension was
unreasonable. (5/24/2012Tr., p.10, Ls.5-18; p.12, L.21-p.13, L.8.) Onthetheorythat
the detention was extended and the extension was unreasonable, the district court held
that the consent was ineffective. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-24.)
Application of the correct legal standards, however, shows that the district court
erred in its legal determination that Officer Cwik extended Brown's detention.

An

investigative detention must be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in
scope and duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176,
181 , 90 P .3d 926, 931 ( Ct. App. 2004).

However, asking a driver limited questions
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about his destination and purpose, or drugs and weapons, are all part of a reasonable
investigation, even if that was not the purpose of the initial stop.

See State v.

Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 129, 134 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Parkinson,
135 Idaho 357, 362-63, 17 P.3d 301, 306-07 (Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, asking Brown
about his irregular driving pattern and destination did not extend the duration of Brown's
detention. Asking Brown about drugs and requesting consent to search Brown's vehicle
for drugs also did not extend the duration of the detention. This is especially true in this
case where the entire dialogue lasted "about 30 seconds." (See 5/24/2012 Tr., p.9,
Ls.8-21.) Because Officer Cwik did not extend the duration of Brown's detention, his
consent was valid and the district court erred by granting his motion to suppress.
Even had Officer Cwik extended Brown's detention by requesting consent to
search, such an extension was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Although

detentions must ordinarily be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop, when the investigative detention discloses evidence of other
possible crimes, officers may extend the detention's duration and expand the
investigation's focus. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916-17, 42 P.3d 706, 709-10
(Ct. App. 2001 ). "The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed ... at the moment the
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at
984, 88 P.3d at 1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances which
could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho
608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990).
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"The officer's observations, general

inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may-and often do-give rise to legitimate
reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer."

kl

While all investigations must be supported by reasonable suspicion, such
reasonable suspicion may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report of
suspected criminal activity. See State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336
(Ct. App. 2000). As explained by the Court:
Whether information from such a source is sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion depends upon the content and reliability of the information
presented by the source, including whether the informant reveals her
identity and the basis of her knowledge. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). An anonymous tip, standing alone, is
generally not enough to justify a stop because "an anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity .... "
White, 496 U.S. at 329. See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269
(2000). However, when the information from an anonymous tip bears
sufficient indicia of reliability or is corroborated by independent police
observations, it may provide justification for a stop. White, 496 U.S. at
331. Where the information comes from a known citizen informant rather
than an anonymous tipster, the citizen's disclosure of her identity, which
carries the risk of accountability if the allegations turn out to be fabricated,
is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and reliability. Gates, 462
U.S. at 233; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47; State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548,
552, 531 P.2d 1193, 1197 (1975); State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47,
981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999); Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901,
907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1995).

kl (emphasis added).
During the suppression hearing, Officer Cwik testified that police had received
information from complainants that drugs were being sold in the area out of a blue
minivan matching the description of Brown's vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12; see
also 4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.6.) While those tips, without information as to
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the informants' identities or their reliability, may have been insufficient standing alone to
provide reasonable suspicion to investigate Brown for drug related crimes, Officer
Cwik's observations during

his initial investigation of Brown's traffic violation

corroborated the information and provided the necessary reasonable suspicion to
expand the investigation.
At about 11 :45 p.m., Officer Cwik saw a blue minivan suspiciously idling in an
almost abandoned parking lot in front of a closed Hastings bookstore, in an area where
no businesses were open. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-18; p.12, Ls.7-12; 5/24/2012 Tr.,
p.5, Ls.8-21.) The minivan matched the description of a vehicle out of which, according
to citizens' reports, drugs were being sold.

(4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, L.19 - p.12, L.6.)

Brown was driving the minivan. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) Officer Cwik followed
Brown as he exited the parking lot and circled the block. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-1 O;
5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.12.) After detaining him, Officer Cwik asked Brown
about this driving pattern, but Brown's response did not make much sense to Officer
Cwik and, according to the district court, was "not a very satisfying explanation."
(4/30/2012 Tr., p.12, L.21 -p.13, L.21; 5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, L.25-p.7, L.5.)
Officer Cwik's independent observations of Brown's suspicious behavior, and the
inconsistency between Brown's answers regarding his destination and his driving
pattern, corroborated the citizens' reports.

Under the totality of these circumstances,

Officer Cwik had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his investigation and
inquire about the drug related allegations. Extending the initial detention's duration by
"about 30 seconds" to request consent to search, in order to confirm or dispel those
suspicions, was reasonable.
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Officer Cwik's 30 second dialogue with Brown, during which they discussed
Brown's suspicious driving pattern and Officer Cwik requested consent to search
Brown's vehicle, did not extend the duration of Brown's detention. Even had Officer
Cwik extended the detention, any extension was based on reasonable suspicion.
Therefore, the district court erred in its legal determination that Brown was unlawfully
detained, making his consent ineffective. Brown's consent to search was valid and the
district court's order granting Brown's suppression motion should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
granting Brown's suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.

DATED this 30th day of January, 2013.

(

r;)~YA
R~PENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of January, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH B. THOMAS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Deputy Attorney General
RJS/pm
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